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INTRODUCTION
Electronic commerce is changing the face of commerce around the
globe. It already constitutes a large portion of business in the United
States and Europe, and has enormous potential for growth world-
wide. The growth of electronic commerce, however, is not limitless.
One factor that could limit the use of electronic media is uncertainty
in the creation of contracts.
In the most general and most used sense, electronic commerce
simply means "the production, distribution, marketing, sale or deliv-
ery of goods or services by electronic means."' This general defini-
tion can be broken down further into a more specific definition de-
scribing three types of transactions: the advertising, searching and
marketing stage; the ordering and payment stage; and the delivery
stage.2 While the second definition reflects the pervasive possibilities
of electronic commerce, the first focuses on electronically effectu-
1. See Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, World Trade Organization
Doe. WT/L/274 (Sept. 30, 1998); see also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES FOR GOVERNMENTS 20 (1997) (defining electronic commerce gener-
ally as "transactions ... based upon the electronic processing and transmission of
data"). Amazon books and e-Toys are prominent examples of sales transactions
conducted electronically that result in the delivery by conventional means of
physical goods.
2. See Committee on Trade and Development-Development Implications of
Electronic Commerce-Note By the Secretariat, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/5I
(Nov. 23, 1998) (describing types of transactions); see also General Council
WTO Agreements and Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/90 (July 14,
1998) (describing types of electronic commerce).
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ated transactions,3 with which this article is concerned.
With respect to transactions, the law can act either as an inhibitor,
through overregulation, or as an enabler, by providing an infrastruc-
ture for the creation of relationships. Unfortunately, much of the at-
tention of those concerned with electronic commerce has been fo-
cused on the former.
The lack of attention paid to enabling electronic commerce is par-
ticularly unfortunate. Electronic commerce, which is blind to politi-
cal borders, could contribute to the process of globalization and its
attendant benefits. While the concept of globalization is somewhat
amorphous,' the most narrow and most often used meaning of the
term globalization is economic globalization." Jeffrey Sachs posits
3. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
1 (1985) (explaining that a transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred
across a technologically separable boundary).
4. See Jeffrey Goldfarb, Top Qfficials to Set Own Polier Agenda in Bid to
Sidestep Government Mandates, 4 ELECT. COrt. & L. (BNA) 76, 76 (1999) (re-
porting that senior officials from leading interet, communication and media firms
have formed a coalition to "stave off' government regulation of electronic com-
merce, particularly with respect to privacy, taxation, intellectual property, content,
and jurisdiction); Arthur Rogers, European Parliament Approves Directive Calling
for Light Regulation ofE-Conmerce, 4 ELECT. COM. & L. 408, 408 (1999) (stating
that the European Parliament emphasizes the need for little regulation, particularly
with respect to transactions that cross borders).
5. See ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL
CULTURE 113 (1992) (arguing that globalization consists of a shift from predomi-
nantly local consciousness to a consciousness that includes a global orientation);
see also IAN CLARK, GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION: INrERNATIONAL
RELATIONS THEORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 16 (1997) (suggesting that the
fact that globalization involves conscious perspective causes the concept to be both
pervasive throughout various disciplines and difficult to define). But see ANTHONY
GIDDENS, CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 21 (1990) (speaking of globalization as
the technological compression of time and space and the concomitant lifting of re-
lationships from the local context).
6. See CLARK supra note 5, at 21 (stating that the vast majority of globaliza-
tion theorists present it as a characteristic of economic activity). Legal theorists
agree. See infra note 9. For examples of a focus on economic integration in a vari-
ety of disciplines, see Daniel Drezner, Globalizers of the World, Unite!, WASH. Q.,
Winter 1998, at 209, 212 (discussing the role of nation states within the economic
logic of globalization); Roger Hayter & Sun Sheng Han, Reflections on China 's
Open Door Policy Towards Foreign Investment, 32 REGIONAL STUD. I (1998) (at-
tributing China's economic policies in part to economic globalization); Richard C.
Jones, Remittances and Inequality: A Question of Migration Stage and Geographic
Scale, 74 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 8 (1998) (discussing economic globalization's effect
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that globalization occurs along four paths: trade, finance, production,
and a growing web of economic treaties and institutions. Similarly,
Stephen Kobrin suggests that globalization consists of deep eco-
nomic integration.8 The majority of legal scholarship also describes
globalization as primarily an economic phenomenon. 9
The benefits of economic globalization are clear.' ° David Ri-
cardo's theory of comparative advantage predicts that international
on transnational wage earners); S.M. Roberts, What About the Children?, 30
ENVTL. & PLAN. 3 (1998) (examining the role of children in economic globaliza-
tion). The pervasiveness of an economic definition of globalization is also evi-
denced in a variety of nonscholarly sources, ranging from Mother Jones magazine
to statements by the Pontiff of the Catholic Church. See Jeffrey Klein, As the
World Turns, MOTHER JONES, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 3 (commenting on economic
globalization that "most of us know that globalization will affect our lives whether
or not we buy more foreign stuff or even pay attention."); Pope, In Message, Urges
a Just Globalization, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1998, at A5 (reporting on a statement of
the Pontiff that peace should accompany economic globalization).
7. See Jeffrey Sachs, Interlocking Economies: Unlocking the Mysteries of
Globalization, FOR. POL'Y, Sping 1998, at 97-98 (describing the four paths of
globalization).
8. See Stephen J. Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalization: State Sover-
eignty in a Networked Global Economy, in GOVERNMENTS, GLOBALIZATION AND
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 146, 149-50 (John H. Dunning ed., 1997) (summarizing
the authors views on economic globalization).
9. See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429, 429 (1997) (recognizing a number of transnational rela-
tionships that comprise globalization but posits that the primary aspect of the phe-
nomenon is economic); see also Lan Cao, Toward a New Sensibility for Interna-
tional Economic Development, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 209, 213 (1997) ("Every major
structure of power in the world economy has become increasingly globalized");
Richard A. Grasso, Globalization of the Equity Markets, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1108, 1114-15 (1997) (discussing the "dawn of equity globalization"); Miguel de
la Madrid H., National Sovereignty and Globalization, 19 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 553,
555-57 (1997) (presenting economic trends in globalization); Gustavo Visentini,
Compatibility and Competition Between European and American Corporate Gov-
ernance: Which Model of Capitalism?, 23 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 833, 846 (1998)
(discussing financial globalization); H6ctor Fix-Fierro & Sergio L6pez-Ally6n,
The Impact of Globalization on the Reform of the State and the Law in Latin
America, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 785, 786 (1997) (suggesting that traditional juris-
prudential thought is ill-prepared to deal with the broad concept of globalization
because traditional jurisprudence was formed within the concept of the nation/state
system).
10. Yet, they are not undisputed. See Sachs, supra note 7, at 97-98 (noting that
skeptics suggest that the linking of rich and poor countries through globalization
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trade allows countries to specialize in the production of goods and
services that they are the most efficient at producing. Countries do
not need to produce goods or services that they are less efficient at
producing because they can purchase those goods and services from
other countries." The channeling of resources to their most efficient
uses results in greater wealth for all trading countries.' 2 This phe-
nomenon underlies the predictions for increased global wealth that
accompanied the trade liberalization introduced by the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, predictions that ranged
from 212 billion U.S. dollars per year to over 274 billion U.S. dollars
per year starting in the year 2002.': If, as the economic definitions of
globalization suggest, globalization does increase transnational trade,
then Ricardo's theory suggests an increase in global wealth for all.
Electronic commerce, therefore, should be nurtured.
While the technology that supports electronic commerce is blind
to borders, the laws that support electronically created relationships
are not. Businesses, then, have the physical ability to transact across
borders but are uncertain as to what will happen when they do so.
Without that certainty, it is unlikely that businesses will, in fact, fully
exploit the potentials of electronic commerce. Even though the
World Trade Organization recognizes the importance of electronic
vill increase inequality in the rich countries and will cause dislocation in the poor
countries).
11. See FRANKLIN R. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMEN- 38 (7th
ed. 1994) (explicating the theory of comparative advantage): Alan 0. Sykes.
Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM L. RE%.. 199, 199
(1989) (explaining comparative advantage and countervailing duty laws); see also
Richard H. Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion
Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J. IN'T'L L. 318,
318-19 (1993) (stating that no economic theory of trade has been more dominant in
the last two centuries than David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage).
12. See Root, supra note 11, at 38; see also EDWIN MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS:
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, DECISIONS 358 (7th ed. 1992) (discussing wealth creation
through international trade).
13. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OLTLOOK:
MAY 1994, at 86-87 (1994) (summarizing four different studies on the predicted
increase in global wealth that would be caused by increased trade due to trade lib-
eralization introduced by the Uruguay Round): see also John H. Jackson, World
Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1227, 1231 (1992) (stating that the basic policy underlying the world
trading system is "to pursue the benefits described in economic theory as 'com-
parative advantage").
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commerce, its response has been to focus on inhibitory regulations.
With respect to contract formation, the World Trade Organization
requests only that its members adhere to standards created by any
recognized international organization. 4 Given the number and inade-
quacy of these standards, this request does virtually nothing to create
certainty.
This paper suggests that the World Trade Organization is in a po-
sition to remedy the anomalous situation created when technological
ability surpasses legal infrastructure. The World Trade Oranization
can and should promulgate a legal regime among its members. How-
ever, because the Organization itself does not have the resources or
the expertise to create such a regime, its role should be one of coop-
erative coordination among those organizations that do have re-
sources and expertise. An instructive example of such cooperation is
the World Trade Organization's formalized cooperation with the
World Intellectual Property Organization.
I. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE IS IMPORTANT
Two types of changes possibly indicate the importance of a busi-
ness practice: those that affect the way that business is conducted and
those that affect the way that people view business. Electronic com-
merce is effecting both types of changes, clear evidence that elec-
tronic commerce is important.
Due in part to electronic commerce itself, the rapidly changing
business environment makes figures notoriously unreliable. None-
theless, three simple tables illustrate the insinuation of electronic
commerce into global commerce. These tables demonstrate that
businesses are spending an increasing amount of money on engaging
in electronic commerce, that electronic commerce represents an in-
creasingly large percentage of commercial transactions, and that
electronic commerce is changing the nature of retail sales around the
globe.
14. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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Table I
SPENDING ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE'
Country/ Compound
Region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Annual
Growth
U.S. 37.2 74.4 133.1 222.7 407.2 707.9 80%
Europe 5.6 18.8 49.4 112.4 223.0 430.3 138%
Asia/ 0.7 1.9 3.9 7.6 14.6 27.5 109%
Pacific I I
Japan 1.9 5.3 10.9 18.6 28.7 44.9 88%
Rest of 4.9 10.6 20.3 36.6 60.2 106.8 85%
World
Total 50.3 111.0 217.6 397.9 733.7 1,317.4 92%
Clearly, the amount that businesses spend on electronic commerce
is growing. Electronic commerce, therefore, constitutes a part of
commerce that businesses cannot ignore. Significantly, increased
spending on electronic commerce is not limited to the United States
or even to the West. Moreover, in addition to raw spending by busi-
nesses, transactions represent a growing portion of commerce. Japan
and the United States provide useful examples as illustrated by the
next table.
15. Figures are in billions of U.S. dollars, and are taken from Tim Wilson, Act
Globally Think Locally, INTERNET WEEKLY, Nov. 15, 1999.
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Table 2
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
1
6
- Market Size fin Yen]
Japan 1998 (bn) 2003 (bn) % Growth
Business-to- 65 3,160 4,762
consumer
Business-to- 8,620 68,000 689
business
Total 8,685 1 71,160 719
Japan as % of US 40 38 _+__ d
US 1998 (bn) 2003 (bn) % Growth
Business-to- 2,250 21,300 847
consumer
Business-to- 19,500 165,300 748
business
Total 21,750 186,600 758
- Percentage of commercial transactions conducted electronically
Japan 1998 2003 % Growth
Business-to- 0.02 1.0 0.98
consumer
Business-to- 1.5 11.2 9.7
business
us 1998 2003 % Growth
Business-to- 0.4 3.2 2.8
consumer
Business-to- 2.5 19. 16.6
business
In raw dollar terms and in percentage terms, the amount of com-
mercial activity conducted electronically is increasing. Indeed, by
2004, seven percent of retail sales overall will be conducted elec-
tronically.' 7 That percentage, however, may be much higher in par-
ticular industries. The third table, representing retail sales in the
16. Figures are taken from David Kilburn, East-Bound Traffic, MARKETING
WEEK, Oct. 28, 1999, at 29.
17. See Forrester Report: Market Overview (Sept. 1999)
<http://www.forrester.com/ER/ResearchlReport/MarketOverview> [hereinafter
September Report] (copy on file with author).
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United States, demonstrates the pervasive nature of electronic com-
merce in some industries.
Table 3
U.S. ONLINE RETAIL PROJECTIONS BY CATEGORY"'
% of
total
2004
(Millions) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 retail
Total US revenue 20,252 39.755 64,179 101,128 143.758 184,481 7%
Media 3,617 ,461 7.444 10.091 11,867 12.58 22%
Sofivare 1,240 1,898 2,472 2,964 3.168 3,290 50%
Books 1,202 1,715 2,200 2,724 3.152 3.279 16%
Music 848 1,386 2,067 3,213 3,946 .286 R5%
Videos 326 463 705 1,190 1.601 1.743 15%
Event tickets 300 169 1,208 1,926 .917 3,929 14%
Apparel 1.620 3,607 6,581 14,710 20,181 27128 9%
General apparel 1,061 .,566 5,106 12,333 16,694 22,516 11%
Footwear 121 290 392 605 902 1,085 20%
Accessories 38 751 1,083 1,772 2,585 3,527 9%
Gfts and flowers 56 998 1,788 .853 3,923 4.654 12%
Flowers 54 550 1,000 1.565 2:151 2,472 13%
Greetings 134 177 333 587 729 798 8%
Specialty gifts 167 271 454 701 1,043 1,389 13%
Household goods 250 618 1.221 2,084 3,562 5.755 3%
Recreation 595 2,139 4S9 6,961 11,243 15,039 6%
Toys and video
games 253 610 1,098 1.739 2.991 3,663 10%
Sporting Goods 165 586 1,162 1,949 3,068 4,220 8%
Tools and garden 177 944 1.930 3.273 5,184 7.156 5%
Leisure travel 7,798 13.950 20,732 26.042 29,447 p32.097 12%
Automobiles 400 1.800 ,500 12,200 1b.567 4%
lectronics 3,178 5.785 9,710 15,317 20.152 24.211 16%
Computer harware 1,964 3,471 5,737 9.154 11,424 12,541 40%
Consumer elec-
tronics 1,205 2,315 3,974 6,163 ,728 11,670 10%
Housewares 446 1.000 1,574 2,584 113 5.908 6%
Appliances 179 k05 459 756 1.268 2,023 9%
18. Id.
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Furniture 268 95 1,114 1,828 ,845 ,884
Food and beverage 513 1,132 2,459 5,009 10,836 16,863 3%
Health and beauty 509 1,189 2,108 3,833 6,294 10,335 5%
Nfiscellaneous 178 1,807 ,365 5,219 .023.394 14% ...
Forrester Research,' 9 which provides some of the most accurate
data on electronic commerce, suggests that its own estimates and
other estimates of the growth of electronic commerce are too conser-
vative. Forrester points out that consumers will rapidly adopt online
shopping, traditional retailers will offer more goods on the internet,
newcomers will tap new areas for retail selling, and technological
advancements will make online shopping more convenient.2" Forres-
ter also predicts a surge in retail electronic commerce in 2010, when
a generation of shoppers who have spent their entire lives online will
reach their peak earning years. Such consumers "will seamlessly in-
tegrate online and offline shopping."2'
The potential of electronic commerce is changing the way busi-S 22
nesses conduct operations. As the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development points out, electronic commerce is
"more than just an accumulation of ICT applications related to mis-
cellaneous business processes. In its broadest sense, the goal of
Electronic Commerce is the creation of a new kind of commercial
19. See id.
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id. at 3; see also Charting the Trade Routes of the Future: Towards a Bor-
derless Economy, WTO Doc. Press/77 (Sept. 29, 1997) (statement of Renato Rug-
giero, Director General of the World Trade Organization, to the International In-
dustrial Conference) (noting that "[i]n 1995 some 50 million personal computers
were sold worldwide against 35 million cars).
22. See M. Gerrard, The Impact of E-Business on IS Organizations, at 1 (1999)
(stating that E-business is emerging as the dominant business model driver for the
next 20 years) (source on file with American University International Law Re-
viet). Business certainly is not the only profession being changed by electronic
media; the practice of law is also changing. See Melinda M. Hanson, Federal
Electronic Case Filing Project Changing Way Lallyers Do Business, 4 ELECT.
COM. & L. (BNA) 292, 293 (1999) (stating that electronic case filing "represents a
cultural change for the judiciary and attorneys"); RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE
OF LAW: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 286-89 (1996)
(predicting that the developments in electronic media eventually will change the
fundamental nature of the practice of law, from one-to-one advising to proactive
legal information engineering).
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environment in an electronic milieu."' Electronic commerce changes
the fundamentals of almost every segment of business. For example,
shippers and packagers will face an increase in deliveries of smaller
packages on tighter schedules.24 Distributors-in an attempt to avoid
becoming unnecessary middlemen between producers and consum-
ers-are presenting themselves to consumers as one-stop shops that
offer a wider selection of goods and services.5 All business segments
must move to a business structure that accommodates customers'
26
new expectations.
Electronic commerce is also changing theoretical approaches to
business. 27 Again, the fundamental changes wrought by electronic
commerce challenge fundamental theoretical assumptions. For ex-
ample, one theoretical construct poses a tension between richness-
customized products, tailored services, and one-to-one contact-and
reach-mass production, mass distribution, and mass marketing-
and suggests that each company must find its own balance between
the two.28 Electronic commerce removes virtually all of the tension be-
23. See OECD, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
FOR GOvERNMENTS 23 (1997).
24. See Clyde W. Witt, Thinking Inside the E-Box, MATERIAL HANDLING
ENGINEERING, Nov. 1999, at 20 (discussing changing role of shippers and packag-
ers). Packaging, therefore, must be more durable but can be less attractive, as it
must protect the item through shipping but no longer has to draw a consumer's at-
tention. Id.
25. See David Hunter, Distribution Gets Wired, CHEMICAL WEEK, Nov. 3,
1999, at 29, 29-30 (discussing changes to distribution). The article also reports a
survey of 16 global chemical firms and how electronic commerce will change their
sales patterns. Most predicted large increases in their Internet sales but said they
would continue to use distributors. Id. at 31. The role of distributors, however, is
going to change because they will likely become more integrated into the stream
between producers and consumers. Id. at 30.
26. Craig Zupan suggests six basic changes: "replace inventory with informa-
tion, replace vertical integration with virtual integration, eliminate non value-added
steps in the supply chain, move from making segmented products to making cus-
tomer-specified products, move from internally designed products to collabora-
tively designed products, and excel at providing product information and advice."
Craig Zupan, Becoming a Digital Apparel Company: A Sea Change With Major
Implications, APPAREL INDUS. MAG., Nov. 1999, at 64.
27. See SUSSKIND, supra note 22, at 290-92 (predicting that conceptions of law
will also change, from a problem solving paradigm to one of risk reduction or hy-
per specialization).
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two.28 Electronic commerce removes virtually all of the tension be-
tween richness and reach, and thus changes the way that supply
chains, companies, brands, publishing, retail bundling and so much
else are conceptualized." Similarly, electronic commerce will change
the treatment of pricing, competition, and business structure.'
The World Trade Organization estimates that in the near future,
one quarter of the industrial countries' economic activity will involve
electronic commerce.3 Clearly, electronic commerce represents a
potential revolutionary change in the manner in which business is
perceived and conducted, as well as an enormous opportunity for
growth in all commerce, particularly transnational commerce. At the
moment, however, that potential is limited by the uncertainty that ac-
companies the creation of relationships in these new media.
II. UNCERTAINTY CONSTITUTES A LIMIT TO
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE'S GROWTH
The OECD, which supports increased economic activity, summa-
rizes the issue of certainty: "[c]ommerce depends on confidence. For
the electronic marketplace to flourish in both its customer and enter-
prise dimensions, buyers and sellers alike must have at least the level
of confidence in the outcome of electronic commerce as they have in
more traditional kinds of transactions."32 That level of confidence
does not yet exist. Richard Ravin is far more prosaic than the OECD:
"[w]ell, you can't sign an electronic contract. It's never reduced to
paper. Business people are not quick to enter into contracts that they
28. See generally PHILIP EVANS & THOMAS WURSTER, BLOWN TO BITS
(1999).
29. See id.
30. See OECD, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE 16 (1999) (discussing changes caused by electronic commerce).
Among other things, fine market segmentation, auctions, and the ease of changing
prices will change how people conceptualize price structuring. The need for flatter
and more streamlined companies and the ability to collaborate on many levels will
change the way that people view companies. Id.
31. See Helmut Schadow, Telecommunications Price Control and Other
Regulatoty Issues, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 122, 144 (2000) (reporting estimates
from the World Trade Organization).
32. OECD, supra note 23, at 42.
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don't have any certainty will be enforced in courts."" Certainty,
therefore, could constitute the limiting factor with respect to the use
of this otherwise pervasive tool.
A. CERTAINTY IS A PREREQUISITE FOR COMMERCE IN FORMAL
SYSTEMS
The institutions4 that facilitate commerce can be sorted into two
types: formal and relational. Relational institutions rely on preexist-
ing relationships and take into account the social position or status of
the parties that use those relationships.'5 Examples of relationally ori-
ented institutions include the traditional African practice of marrying
a chieftain's daughter in order to secure rights to grazing land, " and
33. Richard L. Ravin, Constitutional Issues Involving Use of the Internet:
Trade Secrets and Digital Signatures, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 751, 755 (1998).
34. Institutions are "previously established sets of guidelines within which a
given group of people relate to one another. These guidelines form the patterned
expectations of behavior for members of that group." Barbara P. Thomas-Slayter,
Structural Change, Power Politics, and Community Organization in .Africa: Chal-
lenging the Patterns, Pu.rles and Paradoxes, 22 WORLD DEY. 1479, 1480 (1994);
see also Stephen Krasner, Structural Cause and Regimne Consequences: Regimes
as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 1 (Stephen Krasner ed.,
1983) ( discussing "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
against which actor expectations converge in a given area").
35. See YEHUDI A. COHEN, MAN IN ADAPTATION: THE INSTIT-rONAL
FRAMEWORK 106 (1971):
Customary law is made up of established rules and procedures that are not
codified, that remain informal and personal in application. In a system of
customary law, the resolution of disputes takes place in the course of face-to-
face relationships within the community. Justice - to the extent it is ever done
-emerges from the collective judgment of the community, often tacit rather
than explicit. The force of law is in consensus, and the personalities and
backgrounds of the disputants play an important part in the outcome.
See also ANN E. MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 40 (2d ed. 1995) ("Nonindi-
vidualistic and even anti-individualistic attitudes are common in traditional socie-
ties, where individuals are situated in a given position in a social context and are
seen as components of a family or community structures, rather than as autono-
mous, separate persons.").
36. See Adam Kuper, African Marriages in an Impinging World: The Case of
Southern Afica, in CONTEMPORARY MARRIAGE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
A CHANGING INSTITUTION 253, 256 (Kingsley Davis ed., 1985) (describing this
process in Southern Africa).
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the contract law of the Soviet Union.
The majority of the world either uses or is moving towards the use
of formally oriented institutions to facilitate commerce. 8 Formal in-
stitutions treat all parties equally and allow the creation of enforce-
able relationships between strangers.39 The contract laws of the
common law systems and the code law systems are examples of for-
mally oriented institutions used to facilitate trade. °
It is important to note two aspects of formal institutions, particu-
larly those of contract laws. First, relationships are enforceable, and
second, relationships can be forged among strangers. Businesses can
seek out the cheapest and most suitable transaction regardless of their
relationship (or lack of previous relationships) with the other party.
37. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & VICTOR P. MOZOLIN, CONTRACT LAW IN
THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND GENERAL CONCEPT 3 (1992)
(stating that contract law in the Soviet Union was infused with social purpose and
must be understood as a social phenomenon); Lisa A. Granik, Soviet Contract Lawv
and Peristroika, 78 GEO. L.J. 231, 236 (1989) (book review) (noting that in Soviet
law existing relationships had an effect on how contracts would be interpreted).
38. See Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 229, 293-95 (1999) (discussing change to contracts in emerging econo-
mies).
39. See COHEN, supra note 35, at 106-07:
Formal law is administered through formal and often ritualized legal proce-
dures. In such systems, lawyers and judges emerge as specialized technicians
who study the law and rely on precedent and stereotyped actions in deter-
mining what it is and how it is to be applied .... A concern with precedent
and ritualized procedure is intimately related to the use of impersonal criteria
as the ideal standard in the administration of law.
See also ELMER S. MILLER, INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 190
(1979) (explaining that informal law is personal, whereas formal law is imper-
sonal).
40. Contracts within the common and code law systems are formal institutions
in that they allow for the creation of enforceable relationships among strangers
without regard to preexisting relationships. This attribute of a contract is often re-
ferred to as "freedom to contract." See Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptut-
alism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (1995) ("The most fundamental
conception returning to dominate contract law today is 'freedom of contract."').
The French equivalent is autonomy of the will. See BARRY NICHOLAS, TIlF
FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 35 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that autonomy of will is
"common to both English and French classical theories and remains part of the
common currency of both systems").
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In other words, widespread commerce can occur." Indeed, while
some commerce does occur on a relational basis,'2 the operation of a
free market depends on formal contractual institutions.4' John Wallis
and Douglass North go so far as to say that contract "undergird[s]
our modem economy.""
Contract law provides certainty in two areas. First, it determines
that some promises and agreements will be enforced.4 Second, it
provides clear rules for the interpretation and enforcement of those
promises and agreements, thereby creating certainty and predictabil-
ity for those engaged in commerce.46 Thus, those who do enter into a
relationship with a stranger can both rely on that relationship and
41. See Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, Putting Law Back into the Soci-
ology of Lavyers, in 3 LAWYERS IN SoCIETY 478, 480 (Richard L. Abel & Philip
S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) ("[L]aw is essential to construct and operate even the 'free'
market.").
42. See Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Prelimi-
nary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (discussing business transactions that oc-
cur on a relational basis, and why people choose to use, or not to use, legal sanc-
tions when there is a breach of contract).
43. See Frank B. Cross, Tire First Thing 11'e Do, Let s Kill .ll tile Economists:
An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Laityers on tire United States Economy
and Political System, 70 TEX. L. REV. 645, 651 (1992) (arguing that while market
transactions would occur in the absence of legally enforceable contracts, they
would surely be fewer in number); see also G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and
Trust in Negotiation of Commercial Transactions: Toward a New Cause of Action,
44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 267-68 (1991) (noting that reputational sanctions cannot
provide the amount of trust that legal sanctions can provide for commercial trans-
actions).
44. See John Joseph Wallis & Douglass C. North, Measuring the Transaction
Sector in the American Economy 1870-1970, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN
AMERICAN EcONoMIc GROWTH 95, 122 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gall-
man eds., 1986) (suggesting that the enforcement of private property rights through
formal contract helps explain the contrast between the high-income countries and
the Third World countries).
45. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing the question of
which promises to make legally enforceable).
46. See Cross, supra note 43, at 651 (noting the certainty and predictability
created by contract law); see also G. Richard Shell, Contract in the Modern Su-
preme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 507 (1993) (using the late 1980s collapse of
the Stock Market as an example of the need for clear rules and contractual cer-
tainty in commercial transactions).
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predict what that relationship will be.4
Certainty did not come easy. When projecting forward to certainty
in electronic contracting, it is worth reviewing the development of
certainty in the paper world.
B. CERTAINTY TOOK A LONG TIME TO DEVELOP
Certainty did not appear out of thin air. Both the common law and
the code law systems struggled mightily with the concept of contract.
In both cases, commercial needs provided a great deal of impetus for
the creation of contract law. When considering the uncertainty that
exists with respect to electronic media, it is worth briefly reviewing
those influences.
1. Common Law
Early common law distinguished between written and parole
agreements. Certainty of written agreements could be achieved under
a seal, due to formalities that were attached to a seal that included the
swearing of an oath. The basis for enforcement was moral rather than
legal: the ecclesiastic courts held that violating one's sworn word
was a sin, punishable by excommunication from the church. The
church's threat, therefore, provided certainty. Parole agreements, in
contrast to covenant, did not give rise to an action by themselves.
Rather, action on oral agreements was based on the notion that a
thing or benefit should be returned to the person to whom it was en-
47. But see Avner Greif, Reputations and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evi-
dence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 877 (1989) (describing
avoidance of profitable transactions); see also Avner Greif, Contract Enforceabil-
it
, 
and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalitions,
83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993) (describing the relational institutions of the Magh-
ribi traders). In contrast, those who operate within a relational commercial setting
can deal only with those with whom they have the requisite preexisting relation-
ship. The Maghribi traders of the medieval Mediterranean period, for example,
traded throughout the Mediterranean, but only among themselves; enormously
profitable deals with Christians and Muslims were not entered into because such
parties were outside of the relational system upon which the Maghribi relied for
certainty and enforcement.
48. See R.H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 263 (1987)
("It was a sin to violate one's sworn promise. And the canon law held that one
could be obliged, under pain of excommunication, to complete the promise.").
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titled.49 Thus, action on a simple agreement was possible only if one
party had at least partially performed under the agreement; an oral
exchange of executory promises could never be enforceable in such a
system.50
Common law courts struggled throughout the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries to solve the puzzle of creating certainty with respect
to executory agreements." Pressure for change came from the grow-
ing commercial sector, which, as it grew, depended more on execu-
tory agreements. This expanding commercial sector viewed ecclesi-
astical courts, courts of equity, and lay merchant courts-each of
which enforced certain types of executory promises-as useful alter-
natives to the courts of law.52 Jurists, however, did not want to create
a system whereby any promise, no matter how lightly made, could be
49. See Jean E. Rowe & Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of.-Action anl In-
action in the Law of Tort: Solving tie Pu.tle of Nonfeasance anl Misfeasance
From tie Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 807, 810
(1995) (discussing the difference between enforcement of parol and sealed agree-
ments through the writ of trespass and assumpsit).
50. See PARVIZ OwsIA, FORMATION OF CoNrTRACT: A COMPARTIVE STUDY
UNDER ENGLISH, FRENCH, ISLAMIC AND IRANIAN LAW 125 (1994) (analyzing the
shortcomings and gaps left in the system, which led to the use of equitable reme-
dies).
51. See Clinton W. Francis, Practice, Strategy, and Institution: Debt Collec-
tion i the English Common Law Courts, 1740-1840, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 848
n.159 (1986) (discussing the disadvantages of debt sur contract); see also James
Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Centur
" 
English Contract Law Theor": The
View From Lord Mansfield's Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1956-59 (1988)
(analyzing the change from assumpsit to indebitatus assumpsit). Courts interpreted
sales agreements so that title to goods passed at the time a bargain was concluded,
and thus delivery of the goods or tender of the sales price was no longer necessary
to bring an action for detinue or debt sur contract. These actions, however, were
limited by factual requirements and procedural complexities.
52. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & VIKTOR P. MOZOLIN, CONTqRACT LAW IN
THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND GENERAL CONCEPT 190-91
(1987); see also OWSIA, supra note 50, at 125 (attributing competitive pressure not
only to other court systems but also to competition among the common law courts
of law). The way that the court systems was structured created significant financial
and prestige interests in maintaining large shares of litigation, and thus the possi-
bility that these competing courts would siphon away lawsuits was a serious threat
to the courts of law. See Francis, supra note 51, at 36 (describing interests of law
courts in maintaining share of litigation and describing competition with other
courts).
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enforced. 3 Certainty, therefore, was balanced against common sense.
In the sixteenth century, courts of law recognized a tortious action
based on a set of fictitious secondary promises that were held to have
been exchanged when parties entered into executory contracts--
promises to perform or pay as agreed in the contract. These
secondary promises were enforceable under the action of indebitatus
assumpsit14 From the contemporary vantage point, it seems ungainly
that courts had to fabricate a promise to keep an already given
promise. On the other hand, this fabrication was necessary to
overcome the enormous mental obstacles inherent in the creation of a
method for parties to determine which of their promises would be en-
forced.
In Slade's Case,"" decided in the early seventeenth century, a jury
found that no secondary promises existed. A large body of common
law judges who gathered to debate the matter determined that "every
contract executory imports in itself an assumpsit, for when one
agrees to pay money, or to deliver anything, he thereby assumes or
promises to pay or deliver" and that "the mutual executory agree-
ment of both parties imparts in itself reciprocal actions upon the case,
in addition to action of debt."5 Slade's Case established the nature of
the action of assumpsit and, more importantly, allowed remedy for a
purely executory agreement.5 7 After establishing the enforceability of
53. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REV. 553, 573
(1933) (noting that most "would shudder at the idea of being bound by every
promise, no matter how foolish, without any chance of letting increased wisdom
undo past foolishness").
54. See OWSIA, supra note 50, at 127 (discussing the role of indebitatus as-
sumpsit in the development of contract theory); Harold J. Berman & Charles J.
Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone,
45 EMORY L.J. 437, 452 (1996) (discussing function of indebitatus assumpsit).
55. See Slade v. Morely, 4 Co. Rep. 92, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602). The
impact of Slade's Case on the development of modem contract law cannot be
overstated. See also David Ibbetson, SLtteenth Century Contract Law: Slade's
Case in Context, 4 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 295 (1984) (providing an excellent dis-
cussion on Slade's Case); A.W.B. Simpson, The Place of Slade's Case in the flis-
tory of Contract, 74 L.Q. REV. 381 (1958) (discussing the ramifications of the de-
cisions in Slade's Case).
56. Slade v. Morely, 76 Eng. Rep. at 1074.
57. See 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLiSHi LAW 451 (7th ed.
1965) (stating that Slade's Case made assumpsit the action for common law con-
tracts).
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executory promises, courts were free to refine the rules surrounding
enforcement, and the remainder of the seventeenth century was de-
voted to creating rules of certainty.5'
The tremendous amount of commercial activity and the concurrent
laissez-faire attitude toward business transactions throughout the de-
velopment of contract law cannot be ignored when discussing con-
tract certainty in the context of electronic commerce." The extreme
argument is that the benefit of commercial interests shaped all law in
general. 0 A more defensible argument explains that the exaltation of
commerce affected the development of commercial law, including
contract.61 At a minimum, scholars agree that commercial activity
contributed to the rule of freedom of contract and to rules that cre-
ated certainty with respect to economic transactions between strang-
62
ers.
2. Code Law
Early Roman law created certainty in the creation of a binding
58. It was during this period that the concept of consideration was conceived
and fully developed. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: A
Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576 (1969) (discussing
development of the doctrine of consideration), Robert H. Jerry, The Wrong Side of
the Mountain: A Connent on Bad Faith 's Unnatural History, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1317, 1327 (1994) (noting that the 17th century court was devoted to developing
the concept of consideration).
59. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX.
L. REv. 645, 667 (1985) (noting that Herbert Spencer is often put forth as an ex-
ample of this attitude). Spencer, the Dean of the School of Social Evolution,
viewed the state as an "inefficient and potentially harmful instrument ....
[S]ociety survived only when every person had maximum freedom with a mini-
mum of restrictions." Id.
60. See Louis E. Woulcher, The Privilege of Idleness: .4 Case Study of Capi-
talisin and the Conmnon Laiw' in Nineteenth Centun- .4*nerica, 36 AM. J. LEG. HIST.
237, 239-40 (1992) (discussing the subsidy theory of Gary Schwartz).
61. See FARNSWORTH & MOZOLIN, supra note 52, at 197 (attributing the de-
velopment of a requirement of consideration to the influence of business interests
on the law); see also CECIL H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF COMMON
LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 399 (1949) ("The large commercial interests of the
new age sought a general sanction not for charitable gifts but for business enter-
prise. In such an environment it is not surprising that the judges should have re-
quired some material inducement to the defendant's undertaking.").
62. See LAWRENCE M. FREIDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965)
(discussing how the notion of freedom of contract intertwined with laissez-faire).
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agreement through a ritual stipulatio.63 The ritual required the saying
of certain words in a certain order as well as a symbolic transfer of a
scale. 64 By the end of the first century B.C., the consent of involved
parties enforced commercial contracts, although these contracts still
were required to comply with certain formulas.
Justinian's codification of first century B.C. laws faced numerous
refinements following its rediscovery in Bologna in the eleventh
century. By the sixteenth century, the general outline of certainty was
clear.66 The natural law principle of pacta sunt servanda acted as a
secular substitute for the religious tenet that prescribed the keeping
of one's word (in order to prevent the sin of lying) .6 As a natural law
principal, pacta sunt servanda was more readily accepted by jurists
than was the canonist prescription, and thus provided the lay courts
with a coherent rationale for enforcing purely executory contracts .6
Code law, however, confronted the same problem as common law:
how to balance certainty against the severity of enforcing every
63. See Barry Nicholas, Introduction to the French Law of Contract, in
CONTRACT LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH COMPARISONS 7, 7 (Donald Harris &
Denis Tallon eds., 1989) (stating that Roman law concepts remain visible in mod-
em French contract law).
64. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, "Coming to Our Senses": Communication anul
Legal Expression in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873, 896 (1992) (de-
scribing questions and answers of stipulatio). Over time the ritual became more
attenuated and flexible. See Barry Nicholas, Verbal Forms in Roman Law, 66 TUL.
L. REv. 1605, 1610 (1992) (stating that stipulatio consisted of congruent questions
and answers rather than set words).
65. See Nicholas, supra note 64, at 1605-06 (discussing nature of formulas).
Contracts were enforced by praetors-officers in charge of civil disputes. Over the
course of three hundred years, the praetors devised the formulas that were required
for giving effect to the various types of consensual contracts.
66. See OWSIA, supra note 50, at 140 ("By the sixteenth century the Roman
law of contracts as it had been revived and applied in the southern part of France
provided certain fragmentary elements to be used for the construction of a general
theory of contract.").
67. See Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT'L
L. 405, 430 (1994) (stating that French emphasis on pacta sunt servanda may be
the fundamental difference between French and common law notions of contract).
Pacta sunt servanda for French law consists of exact performance of a contract,
while in common law, the focus is on conclusions. Id.
68. See OWSIA, supra note 50, at 140 (discussing replacement of canomst rules
with pacta sunt servanda).
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agreement. 9 In order to resolve this problem, French jurists returned
to Roman law. Roman causa, which examines parties' motives for
entering into an agreement,' transformed into French la cause,
which considers parties' volition.7' An agreement will be binding if
the parties indicate that they wish to be bound by it, and the agree-
ment is legal.7
3. The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods
Certainty is also important with respect to contracts between par-
ties in different countries.7 The international community recognized
the need for transnational certainty as early as the 1930s, when the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law requested a
group of European scholars to draft a uniform law for the interna-
tional sale of goods. That effort was suspended during the Second
69. Cf Arthur T. von Mehren, Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An Er-
ercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1009, 1015-16 (1959) (noting
that "no legal system attempts to enforce all promises or agreements").
70. See Ernest G. Lorenzen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of(Contracts,
28 YALE L.J. 621, 624-25 (1919) (explaining that causa in Roman law is that
which makes a breach actionable). See generally WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 42-48 (2d ed. 1937) (providing a lengthy explanation of
causa).
71. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE 411 (John H. Crabb trans., 1977) (defining "la
cause" as an element "consisting of an adequately serious 'cause' or reason for a
person to have obligated himself contractually; parallel in function to 'considera-
tion' in Anglo-American contracts, and often similar in factual basis, it is %, ithout
the formal concept of reciprocal exchange of benefits and detriment."); see also
von Mehren, supra note 69, at 1009 (comparing common law consideration with a
cause). See generally Nicholas, supra note 40, at 19 (cautioning, however, that la
cause is not a perfect analog to consideration because after ascertaining that the
parties intended to be bound its primary function is to den), effect to illicit or im-
moral contracts).
72. See MICHAEL H. WHINCUP, CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE: THE ENGLISH
SYSTEM AND CONTINENTAL COMPARISONS 70 (2d ed. 1992) (explaining that ha
cause has two parts, the first asking whether the parties' intent to be bound exists,
and the second asking if the reasons and purposes of the parties are lawful).
73. See John Fitzpatrick, The Lugano Convention and Western European Inte-
gration: A Comparative Analysis of Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe and the
United States, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 695, 727 (1993) (noting the need for contractual
certainty in transnational transactions); see also Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972) (emphasizing the need for certainty in transnational commercial
contracts to avoid and resolve potential disputes).
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World War, and revived in 1951 at the request of a number of Euro-
pean nations. In 1956 a draft law circulated for comment. During this
time, the scholars also began working on a uniform law for the for-
mation of contracts for the international sale of goods. A draft of that
law circulated in 1958.
74
In April of 1964, The Hague convened a conference to act on the
two draft uniform laws. That conference, in turn, promulgated two
conventions: the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods
and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods. Both conventions became effective in 1972,
after ratification by at least five parties.7 5
From the outset, it was clear that the Uniform Laws would not be
globally adopted. The drafting and promulgation of the Uniform
Laws had come almost exclusively from Europe, and other regions
were thus hesitant to adopt them.76 Nonetheless, the need for a cohe-
sive transnational infrastructure remained. In 1966, the United Na-
tions formed the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law ("UNCITRAL") for the purpose of dealing with issues of inter-
national trade law.77 One of the first issues taken up by UNCITRAL
was the need for a uniform law for international sales contracts.
Rather than work from the conventions promulgated by The Hague,
UNCITRAL decided to create new conventions using more globally
representative negotiating groups. In 1978, a full decade after it be-
gan deliberations, UNCITRAL concluded a draft on international
sales and a draft on contract formation. In a moment of common
74. See John Honnold, A Uniform Law for the International Sales, 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 299 (1959) (recounting the efforts to formulate and circulate this law).
75. See John 0. Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 223, 225-27 (1979) (dis-
cussing history of the Uniform Laws); see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Consen-
sus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through the Prism of Unibrm
International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996) (noting the history of the con-
ventions).
76. See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAWS FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 6 (3d
ed. 1999) (describing the structure and functions of UNCITRAL); see also Ex-
planatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UN Doc. V.89-53886 (June
1989) (discussing the limited representation and the subsequent hesitation in other
regions).
77. G.A. Res. 2205(XXI), I Yearbook 65 (Dec. 17, 1966).
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sense, it combined the two drafts into the draft Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, and submitted the draft for
approval.
In 1980, UNCITRAL convened a conference in Vienna for the
purpose of concluding the Convention. Sixty-two nations and eight
international organizations participated in the meeting. Several
working groups heavily scrutinized the draft and modified various
sections. The Convention then passed with no dissenting votes. Over
fifty countries have ratified the Convention."
The driving force behind the unification of laws with respect to
transnational contracts for sales was the desire to create certainty
through uniformity. 9 The multiplicity of national laws left transna-
tional actors uncertain as to which law would apply and how the law
would be interpreted. 0 By reducing or eliminating these uncertainties
and creating certainty regarding the rules and the interpretation of
those rules, the drafters of the Convention hoped to increase the
amount of international trade and thus the benefits that flow from
that trade."' Indeed, the transmittal letter that accompanied the pro-
78. See HONNOLD, supra note 76, at 10-11 (listing the voting statistics and dis-
cussing the conference). The original eleven parties to the Convention were Ar-
gentina, China, Egypt, France, Hungary, Italy. Lesotho, Syria, United States,
Yugoslavia and Zambia. As of January 1997, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cuba. Czech Republic, Denmark,
Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guinea, Iraq, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania,
Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Uganda, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, had also become parties to the Convention.
79. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramic Nuova D'Agastino S.P.A.,
144 F.3d 1384, 1391 (1998) ("One of the primary factors motivating the negotia-
tion and adoption of the CISG was to provide parties to international contracts for
the sale of goods with some degree of certainty as to the principles of law ..
see also C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 3, 8-9 (1987) (stating that the
primary goal of the Convention was the unification of international sales la').
80. See MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc., 144 F.3d at 1391 (stating that the
uncertainty prior to the Convention included uncertainty as to interpretation and
choice of law); Note, Unification and Certaint': The United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 97 HARV. L. REv. 1984 (1984)
[hereinafter Unification and Certaintl] (discussing the effect of uncertainty in in-
ternational transactions).
81. See C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 3 (1987) (stating that uni-
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posed convention to the United States Senate stated:
International trade is now subject to serious legal uncertainties. Questions
often arise as to whether our law or foreign law governs the transac-
tion .... The Convention's uniform rules offer effective answers to these
problems. Enhancing legal certainty for international sales contracts will
serve the interests of all parties engaged in commerce by facilitating in-
ternational trade.2
C. No CERTAINTY EXISTS IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
The certainty that developed over several hundred years of evolu-
tion of contract law does not extend to electronic contracts. "' In large
part, that is because they are electronic contracts. "Existing business
and legal infrastructures embrace a technology that had its begin-
nings more than 500 years ago. The reliance on paper-based systems
presents a formidable barrier to the adoption of electronic means of
conducting business."
formity aims to "assure the most orderly and secure development possible of
commercial life"); see also James J. Callaghan, U.N. Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods: Examining the Gap-Filling Role of CISG in Two
French Decisions, 14 J.L. & COM. 183, 185 (1995) (stating that certainty in inter-
national sales would have the effect of "facilitat[ing] the flow of international
trade" and generally "serve the interests of all parties engaged in commerce").
82. Message from the President of the United States to the Senate Transmitting
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1290 (Sept. 21, 1983). Not everyone agrees that the
Convention has created the certainty sought by its drafters. See, e.g., David Frisch,
Commercial Common Lai; the United Nations Convention on the International
Sale of Goods, and the Inertia of Habit, 74 TUL. L. REV. 495, 507-08 (1999) (stat-
ing that because the Convention "was not drafted with any particular legal system
in mind, there will be no reliable source of gap fillers" and thus the benefits of uni-
formity will not be achieved); see supra Unification and Certainty, note 80, at
1984 (stating that the uniformity of the Convention is illusory).
83. See BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: EDI, E-
MAIL, AND INTERNET: TECHNOLOGY, PROOF AND LIABILITY §§ 4.3, 7.3, 10.1, 13.4
(2d ed. 1995) (discussing legal uncertainties associated with electronic commerce).
84. Randy V. Sabett, International Harmonization In Electronic Contmerce
and Electronic Data Interchange: A Proposed First Step Toward Signing On the
Digital Dotted Line, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 511, 526-27 (1996); see also Amelia 11.
Boss, The Internet and the Law: Searching for Security in the Law of Electronic
Commerce, 23 NOVA L. REV. 583, 585 (1999) [hereinafter Boss, Internet and the
Law] (noting centuries of jurisprudence "devoted to and predicated on paper-based
systems of communication, particularly in the area of commercial law"); Jeffrey B.
Ritter & Judith Y. Gliniecki, International Electronic Commerce and Adninistra-
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Uncertainty in the electronic domain manifests itself in three ways.
First, the law is slow to respond to the new situations created by
electronic commerce." Second, the uncritical application of existing
law to the situations created by new technologies is inadequate."
Third, the creation of different laws by different jurisdictions reduces
certainty and predictability. 7
The lack of certainty can be illustrated by a brief examination of
multinational and local attention to the creation of electronic contract
law.
1. UNCITRAL Has Failed to Create Certaint ,
Just as UNCITRAL took up the issue of transnational contracting
in the 1970s, it also attempted to deal with electronic contracting in
the 1990s and beyond.8 In 1984, UNCITRAL received a report from
the Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Proce-
dures. 9 The report noted that the environment of transnational com-
tive Law: The Need for Harmonized National Reforms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263,
264 (1993) (arguing that "current legal structures pervasively incorporate a prefer-
ence for paper-based systems").
85. See Sabett, supra note 84, at 529 (describing the slow reaction of law to
technological advances as a barrier to the use of electronic commerce); Ritter &
Gliniecki, supra note 84, at 263 (stating that law is failing the challenge of keeping
pace with technological change); see also Houston Putnam Lowry, The United
Nation's Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on Electronic Com-
merce and Guide to Enactment, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 433, 433 (1999)
("The law must keep up with technology if it is to remain relevant.").
86. See Sabett, supra note 84, at 527 (discussing hardships created by applying
existing contract law to electronic contracts).
87. See Ritter & Gliniecki, supra note 84, at 283 (concluding that differing re-
gimes are burdensome and costly and may keep out smaller companies); see also
Sabett, supra note 84, at 534 (arguing that transnational use of electronic com-
merce will not occur on a large scale until laws for electronic commerce are har-
monized).
88. See Boss, The Internet and the Law, supra note 84, at 587 n.6 (stating that
"UNCITRAL has taken the lead at the international level in formulating the law
governing electronic commerce"); see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic
Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 730 n. 177 (1998) (describing the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce as a continuation of the Con-
vention and as taking the Convention "one step further" because of the emphasis
on uniformity of interpretation).
89. See Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship
Between International and Domestic Law Reform, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1931, 1950
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merce was moving toward information exchange and suggested that
UNCITRAL was the appropriate body to deal with the legal ques-
tions created by this change. 90 The following year, UNCITRAL
adopted a recommendation encouraging governments to take certain
actions regarding automatic data processing. That recommendation
was endorsed by the General Assembly.9'
In 1988, UNCITRAL reported that national governments had done
little with respect to automatic data processing, and that the elec-
tronic formation of contracts was emerging as a significant issue.92
UNCITRAL, thus, undertook to consider issues surrounding the
electronic formation of contracts, and placed the matter within its
Working Party on International Payments. That Working Party
eventually suggested that UNCITRAL create and promulgate uni-
form rules on electronic commerce.93 The Working Party was re-
named the Working Party on Electronic Data Interchange and given
this task.
The Working Party spent four years drafting a model law on elec-
tronic commerce and used the laws of local sovereigns as a starting
n.68 (1998) [hereinafter Boss, Electronic Commerce] (identifying the United Na-
tions center for Electronic Facilitation of Administration, Commerce and Transport
(UN/CEFACT) as the successor to the Working Party on the Facilitation of Inter-
national Trade Procedures and describing the current functions of the body as pri-
marily dealing with issues of data interchange).
90. See Legal Aspects of Automatic Trade Data Interchange, UN Doc.
TRADE/WP.4/R. 185/Rev. 1 (1984).
91. See G.A. Res. 71, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Agenda Item 135, para. 5(b),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/71 (1986) (calling upon both governments and international
organizations to work to "ensure legal security" in the field of automated data
processing in international trade and to co-operate with UNCITRAL to "co-
ordinate legal activities in this field in order to avoid duplication of effort and to
promote efficiency, consistency and coherence in the unification and harmoniza-
tion of international trade law").
92. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/43/17 (1988) (discussing
the subjects to be covered in the Commission's work programme, such as devel-
oping "legal principles that would apply to the formation of international commer-
cial contracts by electronic means," and preparing "a model law on the promotion
and protection of foreign investment").
93. See Report of the Working Group on International Payments, U.N. GAOR,
25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/360 (1992) (opining that electronic commerce could
greatly facilitate transnational commerce but that it would be used little in the ab-
sence of legal certainty).
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point. The goal was to eliminate the parts of those laws that inhibited
electronic commerce, for example the requirements that contracts be
in paper form. A draft model law was submitted to UNCITRAL in
1995. One year later, UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on Elec-
tronic Commerce.94 The Model Law was intended to be enacted as
part of the local law of a sovereign.9 5
The model law very much reflects the working group's focus on
the inhibitory effect of law on the use of electronic commerce. The
heart of the Model Law is article five, which states that
"[ilnformation shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforce-
ability solely on the grounds that it is in the form of a data mes-
sage."96 The intent of this paragraph is to mitigate the inhibitory,
regulatory aspect of law on the use of electronic commerce." In
dealing with this aspect of law, however, the Model Law falls victim
to the third reason that no certainty exists with respect to the forma-
tion of electronic contracts: it leaves regulation in the hands of local
94. See Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Work of
the Sixth Conmnittee at the Fif,-First Session of the UN General AssemblY, 91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 542, 542 (1997) (stating that the adoption of the Model Law was the
main achievement of UNCITRAL that year); see also Boss, Electronic Conmnerce,
supra note 89, at 1947 (detailing the history of the Model Law). The Model Laws
itself can be found at Model Law on Electronic Commerce .Adopted by the United
Nations Connission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 162, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 148, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51,162 (1997), reprinted
in 36 I.L.M. 197 (1997) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
95. See A. Brooke Overby, Will Cvberlaw Be Unibfrm? :In Introltction to the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Connerce, 7 TUL. J. INT"L & COMP. L. 219
(1999) (emphasizing that the Model Law is intended to "provide essential proce-
dures and principles" for e-commerce, while "offering the enacting states broad
discretion to regulate beyond the Model Law in specific areas and also to tailor the
Model Law to their own jurisdictions."); Harold S. Burman, Ten Years of the
United Nations Sales Convention: Building on the CISG: International Commer-
cial Law Developments and Trends .for the 2000's, 17 J.L. & CoM. 355, 358
(1998) (stating that the Model Law "has already found wide usage as a basis for
new national and domestic law proposals on computer-based commercial transac-
tions").
96. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 94, art. 5; see also commentary at
note 31 (stating that article five is the "fundamental principle").
97. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing Towards a Unilbrmn Commercial
Code for Electronic Comnerce or Racing Towards Nonuni/brnity?, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 635, 638 (1999) (stating that "[t]he intent of the law was to facilitate
electronic commerce by providing for essentially equivalent treatment of electronic
and paper records.").
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law and thus does not create uniformity.
Unfortunately, the Model Law also does little to support the fa-
cilitating aspects of law. Only one article, article eleven, deals with
contract formation. This section states that "[i]n the context of con-
tract formation, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an offer and
the acceptance of an offer may be expressed by means of data mes-
sages." 98 This provision illustrates not only the third reason that un-
certainty exists with respect to electronic contracts, but also exempli-
fies that current law is inadequate to deal with technological
advances. For example, article eleven does not take into account the
new communicative technologies of electronic commerce. Even if
article eleven were adopted by every country in the world, the un-
fortunate reality is that it would provide virtually no guidance for
dealing with the new terrain created by electronic media. Thus, the
provision adds almost nothing to the certainty needed for greater
transnational utilization of electronic commerce.
2. Local Efforts Provide Even Less Certainty
The difficulty with local creation of laws for electronic contracting
reflects three general areas of uncertainty in transnational electronic
contracting. First, local efforts are usually reactive rather than proac-
tive. Second, local courts that lack guidance often apply the rules of
paper contracts to electronic contracts. Third, the creation of dispa-
rate local law does not create certainty for those who use electronic
media to create transnational relationships.
A general criticism of local efforts is that they are generally reac-
tive rather than proactive. 99 Local law, in other words, is not at-
tempting to create certainty. Rather, it is attempting to answer ques-
tions raised after parties have entered into relationships. While some
degree of certainty may be created for those who follow, little incen-
tive exists in terms of certainty for those who lead with respect to
transnational electronic commerce.
A second observation is that local courts, in the absence of any
guidance, often transfer the laws that apply to paper contracts and
98. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 94, art. 1I.
99. See Ritter & Gliniecki, supra note 84, at 270 (noting that local law has
been reactive to the changes brought about by electronic commerce).
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apply them to electronic contracts. For example, the United States
District Court for South Carolina compared a web site to a magazine
advertisement and determined that the web site did not constitute an
offer to sell.' 0 This comparison is puzzling because the court also
opined that the web page in question was a hybrid of passive and in-
teractive and, thus, escaped easy categorization."" Similarly in an-
other case, a New Jersey court flatly stated that there was "no sig-
nificant distinction" between electronically formed contracts and
paper contracts.' 2
While this reasoning is straightforward, it is wrong. The digital
world can convey so much more information in so many different
ways between various parties than the paper world that the compari-
son between the two ultimately, and inevitably, must fail.'" Those
who seek certainty will not be satisfied with such an approach.
Finally, dealing with electronic commerce through uncoordinated
local efforts inherently contributes to uncertainty. Electronic com-
100. See ESAB Group Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C., 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 333
(D.S.C. 1999) (holding that the website does not constitute an offer to sell without
some other substantial act to show that the commercial activity was directed at the
forum state).
101. See id. at 330 (explaining that the page was a hybrid because a person
could either telephone the company, create an account on the page, and use the
page interactively, or access the information that was presented on the page and
use that information in a non-interactive manner).
102. See Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1999) (holding that since the plaintiffs were "free to scroll through
the various computer screens that presented the terms of their contracts," the mere
"clicking" on the agreement was enough to show that the plaintiffs assented to be
bound by the terms of the contract).
103. See Robert Barnes, Brookfield Case Shows Poor Fit Between Trademark
Doctrine and Technology, 4 ELECT. COM. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 634 (July
21, 1999) (arguing that courts must create new law because the laws created for the
nondigital media simply do not work). With respect to the particular case he is re-
viewing, Barnes states that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the past was able
to apply old doctrine to the digital media, but that in this case, the application of
such laws finally broke down and the court "had to modify established legal prin-
ciples ... to fit the realities of e-commerce." Id. Again, this phenomenon is not
limited to commercial regulation but instead will be seen throughout many types of
regulation. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Approves Web Link to Cainpaign
Sites; Backs Iquiry Into Need for Internet Rules, 4 ELECT. COM. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 17, at 358 (Apr. 28, 1999) (stating that people inside and outside the Federal
Election Commission believe that FEC rules do not fit the digital media).
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merce lends itself to the creation of relationships without reference to
geographical borders.' 4 To the extent that the laws supporting the
creation of electronic contracts are piecemeal and haphazard, parties
cannot know what to expect with any given relationship that spans
borders. Indeed, it was the uncertainty inherent in a patchwork of
laws that led to the negotiation and adoption of the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. As Bernard Audit
notes, "[m]unicipal laws are ill-adapted to the regulatory needs of
international trade and, in particular, to those of international
sales."' 5
III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR CERTAINTY, BUT
ITS APPROACH IS FLAWED
The World Trade Organization recognizes the simultaneous po-
tential and uncertainty that electronic commerce creates. At the sec-
ond Ministerial Conference, 0 6 the World Trade Organization issued a
Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce.0 7 The declaration di-
rected the General Council' 8 of the World Trade Organization to
"establish a comprehensive work programme to examine all trade-
104. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (discussing borderless as-
pects of electronic commerce).
105. See Bernard Audit, The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria,
in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 173, 173 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., rev.
ed. 1998).
106. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations (The Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 4(l), 33 I.L.M. 1, 16 (1994)
[hereinafter Charter] (establishing the Ministerial Conference as the primary delib-
erative body of the World Trade Organization, and that the Conference was to be
"composed of representatives of all Members" to "meet at least once every two
years."). The first Ministerial Conference was held in Singapore, the second in Ge-
neva, and the third, infamously, was held in Seattle.
107. See Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2 (May 25, 1998) [hereinafter Declaration] (reaffirming that
"global electronic commerce is growing and creating new opportunities for trade"
and urging the General Council to take action to promote electronic commerce).
108. See Charter, supra note 106, art. 4.2, 33 I.L.M. at 16 (providing that when
the Ministerial Conference is not in session, the General Council would meet "as
appropriate" to conduct the business of the Ministerial Conference).
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related issues relating to global electronic commerce."" Addition-
ally, the declaration directed the General Council to "recognize that
work is also being undertaken in other international fora.""'"
The General Council promulgated the Work Programme on Elec-
tronic Commerce in September of 1998."' The programme calls on
each of the three bodies administering the three major trade agree-
ments,"' as well as the Committee on Trade and Development, to
evaluate certain issues relating to their area of interest. No mention,
though, is made of contract certainty. The Council on Trade in
Goods, however, is directed to examine standards governing elec-
tronic commerce.113
Two months later, the Council for Trade in Goods released a re-
port."4 The report specifically notes that the uncertainty or disparate
109. See Declaration, supra note 107. The Declaration also directed members to
continue the practice of not imposing duties on electronic transmissions. Id.
110. See id.
111. See Work Progr'amme on Electronic Commerce, WT/L274 (Sept. 30,
1998) (outlining the functions of the work programme with respect to the relevant
World Trade Organization bodies, i.e., the Council for Trade in Services, the
Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for TRIPS, and the Committee for Trade
and Development); see also John Gero & Tom Oommen, The Impact of Techno-
logical Change in the Canada/U.S. Contert: Electronic Commerce and Trade
Policy-The Government's Role, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 323, 324 (1999) (discussing
the work programme and the two fundamental issues before it--classification of an
electronic transmission as a good or service, and World Trade Organization disci-
plines on domestic regulation related to electronic commerce and its impact on
trade).
112. See Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, Charter, supra note 107,
annex IA, 33 1.L.M. at 28; the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Charter,
supra note 107, annex 1B, 33 I.L.M 44; and the Agreement on Trade Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property, Charter, supra note 107, annex IC, 33 I.L.M. at 81
(representing the three trade agreements annexed to the Charer of the World Trade
Organization). The three trade agreements are administered by the Council for
Trade in Goods, the Council for Services, and the Council for Trade Related Intel-
lectual Property.
113. See WTO Secretariat, Work Programnme.for Electronic Commerce- Back-
ground Note, C/G/W/128 (Nov. 5, 1998) (outlining a list of issues to be discussed
by the Council for Trade in Goods, such as classification of goods for international
trade, custom duties, import licensing and market access to products related to
electronic commerce).
114. See id. ("[E]xamin[ing] and report[ing] on aspects of electronic commerce
relevant to the provisions of GATT 1994, the mulitilateral trade agreements coy-
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treatment of electronic commerce is an issue for consideration by the
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. The report then gives the
only guidance provided by the World Trade Organization for creat-
ing certainty with respect to the creation of contractual relationships
through electronic media:
A link between the [Technical Barriers to Trade] Agreement and elec-
tronic commerce exists insofar as the Agreement encourages the use of
international standards when these exist, or their completion is immi-
nent .... Members would be encouraged by the TBT Agreement to use
international standards in relation to electronic commerce, provided they
are satisfied that the body that has developed them meets the requirements
of being international."'
At this point the report does not differentiate between technical
and legal uncertainties. The report goes on, however, to supply a
non-exhaustive list of international bodies working on electronic
commerce, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, UNCITRAL, the International Telecommunica-
tions Union, UN/CEFACT, and UNCTAD. Most of these bodies are
attempting to create transnational rules for the formation of contracts
through electronic media.
The World Trade Organization's approach to contract uncertainty,
simply put, is to allow Members to choose from a menu of different
possible regimes. ' 16 This approach does little to promote certainty,
and therefore does little to promote transnational commerce.
A. DIFFERENT REGIMES ARE NOT SATISFACTORY
The use of different regimes is unsatisfactory. The uncertainty that
exists in the absence of accepted rules is not mitigated when con-
flicting rules are allowed. Two groups that are the furthest along in
ered under Annex IA of the WTO Agreement, and the approved work pro-
gramme.").
115. See id.
116. See WTO Secretariat, Checklist of Issues Raised During the WTO Trade
Facilitation Symposium-Note, G/C/W/I 13 (Apr. 21, 1998) (emphasizing the need
to address legal issues of electronic commerce, suggesting multilateral solutions
and supporting a facilitating role for the World Trade Organization). The World
Trade Organization has also responded to calls from its members that it co-
ordinates legal regimes in this area.
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the promulgation of rules illustrate this problem. Those two bodies
are the International Chamber of Commerce, which is in the final
stages of developing URETS, and the UN/CEFACT, which has
promulgated the Model Electronic Commerce Agreement.
1. URETS
The International Chamber of Commerce is a nongovernmental
"association of internationally-oriented enterprises and their national
organizations" that works to "promote international commerce
worldwide."' 7 In 1995, the International Chamber of Commerce ini-
tiated Project E-100 for the purpose of "grounding emergent elec-
tronic commerce in reliable, internationally standard practices."'"" In
1997 Project E-100 was renamed the Electronic Commerce Project,
and three working groups were formed: the E-Terms Working
Group, the Information Security Working Group, and the Electronic
Trade Practices Working Group.
In November of 1999, the latter working group concluded the Uni-
form Rules on Electronic Trade and Settlement (URETS)." 9 URETS
is intended to be a general set of rules that are voluntarily incorpo-
rated into an agreement through reference by the parties. These rules
are also intended to apply to any electronic transaction conducted
through any medium.
URETS contains twelve articles. Of those twelve, only three relate
in some way to contract formation. They read:
4.0 Validity and Formation of an Electronic Agreement
4.1 Waiver: The parties, to the extent permitted by local law, waive any
rights to contest the validity of a contract effected by Electronic Message
on the sole ground that it was effected by that particular means of com-
munication.
117. See W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION 25 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the founding of the ICC in
1919 and its membership of over 7000 enterprises and organizations).
118. See ICC Doc. No. ECP 31, at 4 (Apr. 23, 1999).
119. See Uniform Rules on Electronic Trade and Settlement, ICC Doc. No.
(Feb. 2000) [hereinafter URETS] [copy on file with author pending ICC publica-
tion]; see also See Now It's the Chamber of.comnerce: International Chamber of
Commerce Goes Online, CoMMs. WEEK INT'L, Aug. 16. 1999, at I (describing the
International Chamber of Commerce's work on URETS).
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4.2 Compliance with Applicable Law: Each party shall determine that
the content or application of an Electronic Message is consistent with ap-
plicable law of its country and shall take all measures to inform without
delay the other party of any inconsistency and any required action.
4.3 Formation of an Electronic Agreement: An Electronic Agreement
effected by the use of an Electronic Message shall be concluded when the
Electronic Message indicating acceptance enters the information system
of the recipient, in a form capable of being processed by that system.
4.4 Evidence: The parties agree to waive the right to contest the validity
of Electronic Messages solely because these messages are electronic.
5.0 Form & Authentication of Electronic Messages
5.1 All Electronic Messages must identify the sender and recipient(s) and
must be capable of being authenticated.
5.2 All parties to an Electronic Trade Transaction must ensure that all
Electronic Messages are created in a form which is readable by the recipi-
ent.
6.0 Processing & Acknowledgement of Receipt of Electronic Messages
6.1 Processing of Electronic Messages Received: Unless otherwise
stated in these Rules or stipulated in the relevant Electronic Agreement,
all parties receiving Electronic Messages must process any such messages
and initiate any required action within the next two business days after re-
ceipt of those Electronic Messages.
6.2 Acknowledgements:
Acknowledgement is not required unless provided for in the relevant
Electronic Agreement.
An acknowledgement should only be an Electronic Message which refer-
ences the initiating Electronic Message along with the date and time of
message receipt.
An acknowledgement of receipt of an Electronic Message does not neces-
sarily constitute acceptance of the content therein.
Where an acknowledgement of receipt is required, such acknowledgement
must be sent before close of business on the next business day from the
time of receipt of the Electronic Message unless otherwise agreed to by
the parties in the relevant Electronic Agreement.
If the sender does not receive the acknowledgement of receipt by the
close of business on the next business day, or the deadline for the ac-
knowledgement set out in the Electronic Agreement, the sender may treat
the Electronic Message as having never been sent.
Where parties to an Electronic Agreement have agreed to use a designated
party to receive Electronic Messages, receipt by the designated party con-
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
stitutes receipt.":
Of these, article four obviously is the most pertinent to contract
formation. Yet article four says almost nothing, other than that a
contract is formed when acceptance is received. Problems arise when
this rather uncontroversial statement is used to craft a general set of
rules for all mediums. Subpart three states that the contract is formed
when the acceptance "enters the information system of the recipient,
in a form capable of being processed by that system.'' This leaves
open many questions regarding specific technology, such as when a
web page enters a system.',
The efforts of the International Chamber of Commerce are impor-
tant because it is a respected body whose suggestions reach much of
the commercial world.'2 It is likely that, if asked to use uniform
terms created by an international body, many members of the World
Trade Organization would refer to URETS. At the moment, however,
URETS does not resolve uncertainty. Moreover, the International
Chamber of Commerce is not the only international body that crafted
uniform rules for electronic contracts. World Trade Organization
members could also refer to UN/CEFACT.
120. See id., arts. 4-6.
121. See id. art 4.3.
122. The application of rules governing point to point communication technolo-
gies to the Internet is troubling in general and certainly is not a shortcoming of
URETS alone; any regime that attempts a generalized regulation will face this
problem.
123. The Chamber's rules on documentary collection, for example, are the stan-
dard for international letters of credit. The Chamber's INCOTERMS are the stan-
dard terms for assigning responsibilities in the transnational delivery of goods. The
Chamber coordinates regularly with intergovemmental organizations, including the
OECD. See Boris Kozolchyk, The hnnunization of Fraudulently Procured Letter
of Credit Acceptances, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 369. 381 (1992) ("Many instruments
sent for international collection are made subject to the International Chamber of
Commerce rules."); Jon Marks, Trade's Global Police Force, FIN. TIMES, May 8,
1996, at 16 ("The ICC has roles ranging from the exotic-such as countering pi-
racy on the high seas-to the mundane-such as the business of regulating docu-
mentary credits and drafting up international norms for contracts . . . Terms set
down by the ICC may become the near-universally recognised [sic] norms of in-
ternational business.").
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2. UN/CEFA CT
The United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic
Business (UN/CEFACT)'2 4 is the intellectual descendant of Working
Party 4 (which dealt with trade facilitation) and UN/EDIFACT
(which dealt with electronic date interchange)."' UN/CEFACT's
primary mandate is the facilitation of trade through electronic
means.126 As is the case with the ICC's Electronic Commerce Project,
UN/CEFACT is also divided into working groups, one of which is
the law working group. The law working group has produced a
Model Electronic Commerce Agreement, 12 7 which will soon be pre-
sented for endorsement by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions as a United Nations recommendation.1
21
The Model Electronic Commerce Agreement is intended as a
framework agreement that will be explicitly entered into by the par-
ties and will govern subsequent electronic agreements.129 Parties
124. See UN/CEFACT (visited June 12, 2000) < http://www.unece.org/cefact/>
(noting that UN/CEFACT has recently changed its name from the United Nations
Centre for the Facilitation of Procedures and Practices for Administration, com-
merce and Transportation to United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and
Electronic Business).
125. See George F. Chandler 11, Maritime Electronic Commerce for the
Twenty-First Century, 22 MAR. LAW. 463, 467 (1998) (discussing evolution of
UN/CEFACT).
126. See UN/CEFACT Law Working Groups Work Programme, U.N. Doc.
CEFACT/2000/LGO08 (2000) (discussing Law Working Group's mandate).
UN/CEFACT has, for example, worked with international computer consortiums
to create a standard web language for businesses knows as ebXML. See Frances
Williams, Web Standards Plan to Boost E-Business, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at
16 (discussing electronic business Extensible Markup Language developed by
UN/CEFACT and Oasis).
127. See Model Electronic Commerce Agreement, ECE Doc. No.
TRADE/CEFACT/2000/25 [hereinafter Model Agreement].
128. See UN/CEFACT Plenary Session and UN/CEFACT @ Work: Delivering
Solutions for Tomorrow's World (visited June 12, 2000)
<http://www.unece.org/cefact/marchconf/mainl.htm> (discussing plans for the re-
cent UN/CEFACT Annual Plenary session in March 2000).
129. See CEFACT Electronic Commerce Agreement (visited June 12, 2000)
<http://www.sas.upenn.edu/-mkathryn/cefact/CEFACT.html> (providing an ex-
ample of the web form of this agreement). This agreement is effectuated through
an "instrument of offer" that is completed and sent to another party who then com-
pletes and returns the attached "instrument of acceptance." The party that sends the
instrument of offer does not have to be the party that will be the offeror in the
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transacting electronically enter the agreement directly. As a result,
the agreement can be customized according to the parties' needs. For
example, the parties are asked to specify what media they will use
and what media they will accept.' ' Similarly, the parties can specify
whether receipt of transmissions must be acknowledged or whether
an acceptance can be withdrawn.'
The greater specificity and flexibility of the Model Agreement
raise the potential for conflict with the International Chamber of
Commerce's URETS. In contrast to URETS, those who use the
Model Agreement may not be required to send all electronic mes-
sages in a form readable by the recipient" and may not be required
to process messages within two days.'" On the other hand, the Model
Agreement only has effect between parties that proactively enter into
it and does not create background certainty.
The merits of each of URETS and the Model Electronic Com-
merce Agreement are worthy of a separate, much lengthier treatment.
For purposes of this discussion, however, even a brief examination of
the two documents demonstrates that neither one alone creates a
great deal of certainty, and that both together could create confusion.
IV. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
SHOULD COORDINATE LAWS CONCERNING
ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING
Not every issue that touches on transnational commerce falls
within the purview of the World Trade Organization. It is fair to ask
whether the Organization should take on any responsibility with re-
spect to electronic commerce in addition to asking its members to
contemplated electronic transactions, it is simply the party that initiates the fact
that the parties will trade electronically. Moreover, the instrument of offer can be
sent in paper form (thus satisfying underlying writing requirements in some juris-
dictions), in electronic form, or can be posted on a web site and filled out by any
party that wants to conduct business through that site.
130. See Model Agreement, supra note 128, inst. of offer, Sec. 2.
131. See id. §§ 2.3.2, 3.2.2 (noting that the Model Agreement uses default pro-
visions in the event that the parties do not make a choice).
132. See URETS, supra note 120, art. 5.2 (providing, under the Model Agree-
ment, that parties may specify what forms will be used).
133. See id. art 6.0 (indicating that parties to the Model Agreement can choose
whether acknowledgment is required and what the period will be).
2000] 1415
6AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
adhere to some internationally acceptable standard. Answering that
question requires an examination of three narrower questions:
whether the matter of a legal regime for electronic contracts falls
within the authority of the World Trade Organization, what form of
action the World Trade Organization could take, and whether any
precedent suggests that the Organization would be successful.
A. THE MATTER IS WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
The World Trade Organization faces myriad requests for action on
myriad issues ranging from the promulgation of democracy and gen-
der equality to the creation of an international tax code.' Obviously,
the Organization cannot-and should not-attempt to satisfy all of
these requests. The author of this article has suggested elsewhere that
four criteria must be satisfied before the World Trade Organization
undertakes an issue:
The World Trade Organization should not pursue an issue unless it satis-
fies these criteria. First, the issue must be within the legal authority of the
Organization. Second, the issue must be substantial. Third, the Organiza-
tion must be able to enforce any requirement that it makes of its members.
Finally, the issue must require international coordination, and there must
134. See William Diebold, Some Second Thoughts, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1251, 1257 (1995) (suggesting the World Trade Organization issue rules for
international investment); Claus Dieter-Ehrlemann, The International Dimensions
of Competition Policy, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 833, 840 (1994) (suggesting that
the World Trade Organization promulgate rules on competition policy); John H.
Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
17, 23-24 (1996) (pointing out that World Trade Organization will be called upon
to issue rules concerning the environment, antitrust and competition, labor stan-
dards, human rights, distributional issues, gender and other discrimination, and
democratic structure); Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Corruption Through the
World Trade Organization, 28 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 305 (1997) (stating that the
World Trade Organization should require its members to criminalize transnational
bribery); Asif H. Qureshi, Trade-Related Aspects of International Taxation-A
New WTO Code of Conduct?, J. WORLD TRADE 161 (Apr. 1996) (suggesting the
World Trade Organization as forum for promulgation of uniform tax regulations);
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protection-
ism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
393, 393 (1994) (suggesting World Trade Organization take up issue of antitrust
regulations); James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary, Linkage, 27
U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 793, 836 (1994) ("Over time it might be possible to ex-
plicitly link membership in the WTO to adherence to" human rights conventions).
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be a credible argument that the World Trade Organization is the interna-
tional organization that can provide the optimal coordination.'5
Those criteria are satisfied in the case of the creation of contract
certainty for electronic commerce. The issue is clearly within the le-
gal competency of the World Trade Organization. The organic
document of the Organization states as one of its purposes, "ex-
panding the production of and trade in goods and services."' ', Both
the organic documents and the history of the World Trade Organiza-
tion and the organization that it replaces-the GATT-indicate that
the Organization is competent to impose requirements on its mem-
bers in addition to those that are imposed in the trade agreements an-
nexed to the Organization's charter.'" Although electronic contract-
ing could involve relationships other than trade, it clearly is directly
related to trade.'38 Moreover, electronic contracting has very obvious
implications for international trade.'" The issue is within the World
Trade Organization's legal authority.
The issue is also substantial, which is the second criteria. Accord-
ing to the World Trade Organization's own estimations, a quarter of
the industrial world's trade will be conducted electronically.' Elec-
tronic commerce is fundamentally changing the way that businesses
135. Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the liorld Trade Organization: Deter-
mining the Limits of the World Trade Organization "s Authority, 28 NYU J. INT'L
L. & POL. 711,722 (1996).
136. See Charter, supra note 106, at preamb.
137. See id. art. 3(2) ("The [World Trade Organization] may also provide a fo-
rum for further negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade
relations, and a framework for the implementation of the results of such negotia-
tions, as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference."). Several of the multilat-
eral trade negotiation rounds undertaken pursuant to the GATT resulted in the im-
position of requirements on parties to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.
See also JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND 6 (1995) ("[T]he core of the [Tokyo] Round's results con-
sisted of separate multilateral agreements whose main aim was to reduce or control
non-tariff distortions to trade."); John Jackson et al., Implementitng the Tokyo
Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MicH. L.
REv. 261, 267 (1982) (discussing the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions).
138. See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 31.
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conduct business, and the way that business is conceptualized.' 4'No
one can predict how substantial electronic commerce will be, but no
one can deny that it will be substantial.
The matter of creating contract certainty in the electronic realm
also satisfies the criteria of substantiability. Without contract cer-
tainty, businesses are less likely to utilize electronic means of creat-
ing contractual relationships. Furthermore, without an international
regime, they are even less likely to create those relationships across
borders. 
42
Third, the World Trade Organization can enforce member re-
quirements with respect to the creation and harmonization of elec-
tronic contract law. An obviously analogous requirement is con-
tained in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property, which requires members to create and harmonize laws rec-
ognizing and protecting intellectual property rights. 41 It should be
noted that the World Trade Organization itself does not enforce the
requirements. Rather, members bring complaints against other mem-
bers whose actions "nullify or impair" the benefits that should accrue
pursuant to the various trade agreements administered by the Organi-
zation.' 44 Enforcement, then, is easiest if members are required to
take specific, identifiable actions. The creation and harmonization of
electronic contract law is both specific and identifiable. Therefore,
the requirement is enforceable.'
45
141. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; notes 79-82 and accompa-
nying text.
143. See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property
Protection in Developing Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. REV. 1245 (1994) (dis-
cussing requirements imposed on countries and how developing countries will
comply with those requirements).
144. See Charter, supra note 106, annex 2 (stating that dispute settlement be
conducted pursuant to the Understanding on Disputes, another annex to the World
Trade Organization charter); see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 94-95 (1989) (pointing out that the key to invoking the GATT dispute-
settlement mechanism is almost always 'nullification or impairment,' an unfortu-
nately ambiguous phrase); Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreenent on
Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555, 580-87 (1996) (providing an
excellent explication of the dispute settlement process).
145. Examples of requirements that would be less specific and identifiable
could include a requirement that a member create democratic institutions within its
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Finally, the creation of a legal infrastructure that enables electronic
commerce requires global coordination. Electronic commerce has
"demolished" concepts of time and space."M In the process, it has also
demolished the concept of borders.', 7 Electronic commerce is insepa-
rable from the phenomenon of globalization."' At the same time
however, there is no supranational body capable of imposing com-
mercial law across borders-laws are still created and enforced by
sovereigns. The creation of a legal infrastructure that supports elec-
tronic contracts across borders, therefore, requires coordination of
local laws.
49
B. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION COULD COORDINATE
ELECTRONIC CONTRACT LAW
For the most part, the World Trade Organization does not create
international law that it imposes on members.'" Rather, it provides
minimum standards for laws and regulations that must be observed.
The World Trade Organization has demonstrated that its members
will adhere to the standards it promulgates. The World Trade Or-
ganization, however, does not have limitless resources and knowl-
edge.
system of government or that a member adopt nondiscriminatory attitudes towards
unempowered members of its society. See generally supra note 113 (discussing the
many issues that the World Trade Organization has been asked to address).
146. See Walter B. Wriston, Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF. 172, 175
(Sept./Oct. 1997) (acknowledging that the new technological revolution has given
the freedom of information to individuals).
147. See Jessica Matthews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF. 50 (Jan./Feb. 1997)
(noting that globalization has led to the creation of relationships with little regard
for political borders).
148. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text (discussing globalization).
149. See Ritter & Gliniecki, supra note 84, at 283 (stating that harmonization of
electronic contracting laws will increase international trade); see also Boss, supra
note 84, at 587 (stating that businesspeople desire coordination of electronic con-
tracting laws).
150. See Jost Delbrfick, A More Effective Iternational Law or a New "World
Law"?- Some Aspects of the Development of hIternational Law in a Changing
International System, 68 IND. L.J. 705, 720 (1993) (noting that it is almost banal to
repeat that the international legal order lacks a general central law enforcement
authority).
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The Organization, therefore, should cooperate with and coordinate
the work of others who have expertise and resources with respect to
electronic commerce. Coordination with bodies like the International
Chamber of Commerce and UN/CEFACT are good examples of the
benefits of such cooperation. The International Chamber of Com-
merce has expertise in drafting rules of general applicability, but
those rules lack specificity. UN/CEFACT on the other hand, has ex-
pertise in drafting specific rules, but those rules are only applicable
between consenting parties. The combination of those two areas of
expertise under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization-
which has a world wide constituency that adheres to its standards-
would do much to create certainty in the electronic formation of
contracts. 5'
C. A SUCCESSFUL PRECEDENT EXISTS-COOPERATION WITH THE
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION
Once again, the requirements imposed by the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property provide a useful precedent.
Article 68 of that agreement requires the Council for Intellectual
Property, in consultation with the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization, to establish appropriate ways of cooperating with that or-
ganization.5 2 In December 1995, the two organizations concluded a
Cooperative Agreement, signed by the two Directors-General in
January of 1996.'5' The agreement delineates cooperation between
the two in respect to three areas: notification of, access to and trans-
lation of national law; implementation of article 6ter of the Paris
151. Robert Hudec describes a similar symbiosis between the United States,
which had expertise drafting very detailed bilateral trade agreements, and England,
which had experience drafting multilateral agreements of general applicability. The
combined efforts of the two, brought about by their cooperation during the second
World War, eventually resulted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY 5-12 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the cooperation of Great Britain and
the United States).
152. See TRIPS, supra note 106, art. 68.
153. See Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and
the World Trade Organization, WTO Doc. IP/C/6 (Jan. 1, 1996) (purporting to es-
tablish a mutually supportive relationship between these two organizations and to
establish arrangements for future cooperation).
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Convention;'4 and legal-technical assistance and technical coopera-
tion.' In July 1998, the two organizations concluded a Joint Initia-
tive on Technical Cooperation, which specifically delineates means
of providing technical assistance to countries attempting to comply
with the requirements of membership in the World Trade Organiza-
tion."'
Cooperation between the World Trade Organization and the World
Intellectual Property Organization is manifested in several ways. The
World Intellectual Property Organization has established a physical
presence within the World Trade Organization, having observer
status in the General Council, the Council for Intellectual Property,
the Committee on Trade and Development, and several accession
working parties.' Interestingly, the General Council and the Council
for Intellectual Property invited the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization to attend meetings on the subject of electronic com-
158
merce.
The World Intellectual Property Organization has provided sig-
nificant logistical support to the World Trade Organization by pro-
viding copies and translations of intellectual property laws of all
154. Article 6ter of the Paris Convention deals with national emblems and is
also specifically referred to in the Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property. The World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual
Property Organization concluded a separate agreement on Article 6ter. See Imple-
ientation of the Obligations Under the TRIPS .Agreement Stemming from tie In-
corporation of the Provisions ofArticle 6ter of the Paris Convention (1967), WTO
Doc. IP/C/7 (Jan. 1, 1996) (providing for the implementation by World Trade Or-
ganization members of the TRIPS Agreement).
155. See id.
156. See Technical Note on the .Accession Process, \TO Doc.
WT/ACC/7/Rev.1 (Nov. 19, 1999) (describing the accession process to the World
Trade Organization, including a provision for technical assistance to acceding gov-
ernments).
157. See World Intellectual Proper" Organization Statement Circulated by
Dr. Kanril Idris, WTO Doe. WTiMIN(98)/ST/55 (May 18. 1998) (describing ob-
server status); see also Annual Report (1997) of the Council lor TRIPS, WTO Doe.
IP/C/12 (Nov. 28, 1997) (noting conferral of permanent observer status to the
World Intellectual Property Organization).
158. See Council for Trade Related .spects of Itellectual Property Rights
Work Programe on Electronic Conrmerce, WTO Doc. IP C 18 (July 30, 1999)
(discussing the importance of intellectual property for the development of
electronic commerce).
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member and nonmember parties to the Paris Convention. The World
Intellectual Property Organization also provides speakers and con-
sultants for seminars arranged by the World Trade Organization. On
an informal basis, the Council for Intellectual Property often refers to
observers from the World Intellectual Property Organization for
technical assistance when parsing matters of intellectual property
law.
The area of technical assistance is most enlightening for purposes
of creation of a harmonized infrastructure of electronic contract law.
Developing countries that were founding members of the World
Trade Organization were given until the year 2000 to create laws or
bring existing laws into compliance with the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. Parties acceding to the
World Trade Organization must also bring their laws into accordance
with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty. Thus, there has been a huge demand for assistance in drafting or
amending laws so that those laws comply with the international re-
gime. The World Trade Organization has neither the manpower nor
the technical expertise necessary to satisfy that demand. Instead, the
World Intellectual Property Organization has worked with develop-
ing parties and countries acceding to the World Trade Organization.
In other words, one international organization has used its resources
and expertise to help members of another international organization
comply with that organization's requirements. Moreover-and perti-
nent to the possibility of the coordination of efforts by other organi-
zations with respect to electronic contracting-the World Trade Or-
ganization has used other organizations to craft specific national law.
By all accounts, the cooperation between the two organizations has
been very successful.'5 9
CONCLUSION
Electronic commerce is important for many reasons. Some of
these reasons are purely economic. Electronic commerce is also im-
portant, however, because it changes the ways in which people can
create relationships and the ways in which people perceive the world.
159. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
WTO Doe IP/C/M/19 (Aug. 5, 1998) (providing minutes from a July 1998 meeting
that describes a substantial track record of cooperation).
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Electronic commerce also reveals an anomaly of globalization.
The technological ability and the mental willingness to create rela-
tionships now pay little regard to political borders. The legal infra-
structures that support relationships, however, still stop at the border.
At the moment, there is no supranational body to create transnational
legal institutions. Such legal institutions must be pieced together
from national law.
By focusing on the types of regulations that inhibit commerce
rather than turning to laws that enable transactions, the World Trade
Organization is abdicating an opportunity to effectuate greater eco-
nomic activity among its members. It need not do so, and in fact
should not. As perhaps the leader among commercially oriented in-
ternational organizations, the World Trade Organization could work
with other international organizations that have expertise and experi-
ence in creating regimes for electronic contracts. Its cooperation with
the World Intellectual Property Organization provides an example of
prior successful cooperation.
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